In recent years, it has become clear that types in intensional MartinLöf Type Theory can be seen as spaces, alternatively to the traditional view as sets or propositions. This observation motivated Voevodsky's univalence axiom and the development of a whole branch of mathematics, known as Univalent Foundations and Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT).
Introduction
Martin-Löf Type Theory (MLTT), as introduced and pushed forward by MartinLöf [2528] , is a branch of mathematical logic with many applications in computer science, especially in the theory of programming languages. This form of type theory is powerful enough to serve as a framework for the formalization of huge parts of (constructive) mathematics. It serves as the basis of the dependently typed programming language Agda [29] . Better known is the proof assistant Coq, based on a variant of MLTT, the Calculus of Inductive Constructions [10] . Coq acquired much of its publicity in the mathematical community when it was utilized by Werner and Gonthier to formalize a proof of the famous Four color theorem [11] . For more recent work in Coq, we want to mention the Feit-Thompson odd order theorem [12] and the ForMath project [9] .
An important aspect of type theory (intensional type theory, to be precise) is computation: terms are identied with their normal forms. For concrete im-plementations, such as Agda and Coq, this means that we have an automatic simplication of expressions. Such a simplication would, in a proof on paper, have to be done manually by the mathematician, and we believe that the computational behavior of type theory can be seen as one of its main features that make it valuable for the mathematical community.
While the mathematical community seems to appreciate the existence of proof assistants in principle, their practical usage is still mostly restricted to those subjects that are close to logic, or, as in the case of the Four color theorem, those cases that require a case analysis so vast that it is unfeasible to do it by hand. Two reasons for that restriction are certainly the vast overhead that formalizations often require, and certain behaviors of type theory that are not understood suciently.
However, some years ago, progress in the semantics of MLTT lead to a development that has improved the situation with respect to both of these issues.
Traditionally, a number of dierent views on types existed, including types as sets (Russel [31] ) or propositions (Curry and Howard [17] ); see [30] for a discussion. In addition to these, Awodey and Warren [5] and, independently, Voevodsky [36] found out that types may also be regarded as, roughly speaking, topological spaces. This new interpretation has helped to explain a lot of the behavior of MLTT regarding equality types. Voevodsky noted that in his Simplicial Set model (presentation by Streicher [34] , and Kapulkin, Lumsdaine and Voevodsky [18] , extending [19] ) another interesting property is fullled: equivalences correspond to equalities of types. Motivated thereby, he introduced the Univalence Axiom. This axiom implies that isomorphic structures are actually equal and can directly be substituted for each other. This seems to be a key concept if we want type theory to be usable by working mathematicians as a tool for formal verication, or even for actually nding proofs, as mathematicians tend to identify isomorphic structures in informal proofs all the time. Hoping that type theory would nally be more accessible for mathematicians outside of the logic spectrum as he used to be himself, Voevodsky continued working on his Univalent Foundations program.
Soon, the ideas of Awodey, Warren and Voevodsky attracted many researchers from elds that were considered very dierent from type theory, such as higher dimensional category theory and abstract topology, fascinated by the surprising connection that allowed to transfer intuition, or even results, from one eld into another. Traditional type theorists got interested because of the striking consequences of the univalence axiom, some of which had been considered feasible (but hard to realize) before. These direct consequences of univalence include function extensionality (considered, e. g., in [1] ) and an extensional universe [15] . The homotopical view later induced the idea of higher inductive types, yielding very well-behaved quotient types (as previously considered in [2, 13, 14] ) as a special case. In particular, the wish for properties that previously led to the development of Observational Type Theory [3, 4] are naturally satised, or conjectured to be satised, in type theory with the univalence axiom. Due to the homotopical nature of the type theory of interest, it became known as Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT) , often used synonymously with Univalent Foundations. participants, long-and short-term visitors. This was also where Homotopy Type Theory: Univalent Foundations of Mathematics [35] was collaboratively written, in the community often referred to as the HoTT book or even as the book, which will serve as our main reference in this article.
Especially during the program in Princeton, but also before and after, a lot of progress was made. In particular, the formalization of classical homotopytheoretical theorems was pushed forward. The formalized part of homotopy theory includes the calculation of some homotopy groups of spheres, the van Kampen theorem, the Freudenthal suspension theorem, a restricted form of Whitehead's theorem, the Blakers-Massey theorem, and others, mostly reported in [35] . Noteworthy is that, due to the abstractness of HoTT, the proven results are not only true in the simplicial sets model (or, using the realization functor, the category of CW-complexes), but also in other appropriate models of weak ω-categories.
To explain how HoTT achieves these things, we have to go back a couple of steps, or equivalently, about one or two decades. One particularly interesting (and crucial) concept in MLTT is equality. Type theory knows two dierent forms of equality: rst, there is the so-called denitional or judgmental equality, based on what we have just described: terms are identied if they behave identically from the computational point of view, meaning that they have the same normal form. In a more abstract sense, judgmental equality is a metatheoretic concept of MLTT that is used for type checking. In intensional type theory, judgmental equality, and thus type checking, is decidable, a demand that corresponds to the very basic usage of proof assistants: if we have a proof a for a proposition A, the system should be able to check automatically whether a is indeed a correct proof of A. Judgmental equality in concrete implementations usually consists of β-equality and, optionally, some forms of η-equality. In contrast, extensional type theory does not distinguish between judgmental and propositional type theory, making type checking undecidable and therefore not suitable for the purposes that HoTT wants to serve. Consequently, HoTT is based on intensional MLTT.
As we want judgmental equality to be decidable, it is clear that this is a very strict notion of equality. Often, two mathematical objects are equal, but proving so can be arbitrarily hard. The corresponding terms in type theory will generally not be judgmentally equal, but propositionally equal: for any two terms a and b of the same type A, there is the type Id A (a, b) of proofs that a and b are propositionally equal (later, we will often just write a = A b or even a = b).
Propositional equality is thus an internal concept, making the formulation of mathematical theorems involving equality possible.
For some time, it was unknown whether uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP) is derivable, i. e. whether, given p and q of type Id A (a, b), one can construct an inhabitant of the type Id Id A (a,b) (p, q). This question was answered negatively by Hofmann and Streicher, who observed that type theory can be interpreted in the category of groupoids [15] . They also speculated that there might be models using higher groupoids, and even ω-groupoids, but were lacking an appropriate framework for the construction of such an interpretation.
UIP was often considered desirable: it was believed that a proof that a equals b should be the mere information thereof, without containing additional data. The homotopical view does not only show why UIP can not be derived nevertheless but also helps to explain what its absence means. A type can be seen as a topological space, and an equality proof can be understood as a path in this space; but paths are, in general, not unique. However, there might be a path between paths, traditionally called a homotopy, and higher homotopies between homotopies, and so on, giving a space the structure of a weak ω-groupoid. As Lumsdaine [24] and, independently, van den Berg and Garner [7] explained, types do indeed carry the structure of a weak ω-groupoid.
In his PhD thesis, Warren [37] generalizes the Hofmann-Streicher groupoid model. Instead of ordinary groupoids, he uses strict ω-groupoids to model MLTT. He thereby proves that, for any n, the principle UIP n can not be derived, where UIP n is (the judgmental version of ) the statement that, for any type A, iterating the process of taking two points and considering their path space n − 1 times always leads to a type with unique identity proofs. In particular, he shows that having UIP m for all types is strictly stronger than UIP n if m < n.
Voevodsky's model in simplicial sets [36] can be understood as a further improvement of Warren's construction. Instead of strict ω groupoids, Voevodsky uses Kan simplicial sets, also known as weak ω-groupoids; and this is the model that motivated him to formulate the univalence axiom.
One of the most basic and well-known implications of the univalence axiom is that the rst type universe, written U 0 , does not have unique identity proofs. This is due to the fact that, for an example, the type 2 of boolean values is isomorphic to itself in two dierent ways. These two isomorphisms give rise to two dierent inhabitants of Id U1 (2, 2). In the language of HoTT, this means that U 0 is not a set, i. e., is not a 0-type. In general, a type A is called an n + 1-type (or n + 1-truncated ) if, for all a, b : A, the type Id A (a, b) is an n-type. Reading through the argument that U 0 is not a 0-type, it seems plausible to assume that, as we go up the hierarchy of universes, we get types that can be shown to be not n-truncated for higher and higher n, meaning that they have a more and more complicated homotopical structure.
However, this turns out to be fairly involved. As sketched above, the type 2 is sucient to see that U 0 is not a 0-type. To go further, one idea that was suggested several times at the special year program in Princeton (rst by Finster and Lumsdaine, as far as we know) was to consider the type of types that are merely equal to 2, written Σ X:U0 X = U0 2 −1 , where − −1 is the propositional truncation. Technically, propositional truncation is a certain higher inductive type, but it can be encoded in a suitable way so that the construction can be expressed in pure MLTT with univalence, as required. The idea of Σ X:U0 X = U0 2 −1 is to take 2, but wrap it once, dening something like the subuniverse of U 0 that only contains 2. This operation shifts the non-trivial proof of 2 = 2 by one level. Finster and Lumsdaine used the construction to show that U 1 is not a 1-type. It seems plausible that the wrapping could be repeated in order to get the corresponding statements for higher universes, but this becomes dicult very quickly, and it is unclear whether the strategy could be used to prove the general statement. In this article, we will not need to consider truncations at all until we want to discuss connectedness.
Another argument for that fact that U 1 is not a 1-type was given by Coquand, using the type of Z/2Z-sets: a set X, together with an endomorphism on X, and a proof that this endomorphism is self-inverse. It is not clear how a generalization of this construction could be used for higher cases, but in fact, the base case of our construction in this article is similar.
When the attempts to construct a type of non-trivial higher structure, or prove that universes have this property, remained inconclusive, Awodey added the question to the internal list of open problems of the special year program.
In this article, we solve the problem by constructing a family of types, parametrized over n ≥ −1, that are strict n + 1-types (n + 1-, but not ntruncated). It will then turn out that the subuniverse of U n which only contains n-types is already such a strict n + 1-type itself. Our construction also shows immediately that the universe U n is not an n-type. From a homotopical point of view, this means that the rst n homotopy groups of U n are non-trivial.
We say that they are non-trivial in a high dimension or have a high truncation level, even though both expressions are slightly inaccurate. Consequently, in MLTT with univalence, (the internal version of ) ¬UIP n can be shown internally by using suciently high universe levels.
After constructing these types that are non-trivial on a high dimension, we discuss types that are trivial on low dimensions: given a type and a number n we construct, in plain MLTT, a type that is trivial on dimension n and below, while the higher dimensions remain untouched. In HoTT, such a type is called n-connected, a notion that involves certain higher inductive types. We dene a version of n-connectedness without referring to higher inductive types which is fullled by the type we constructed and which is equivalent to the usual n-connectedness in HoTT.
Combining both of our constructions, we present a family M n of types, indexed over the natural numbers and constructed in MLTT from univalence alone, such that M n is trivial on all dimensions except from dimension n. We also discuss how our constructions can be understood as a usage of higher inductive types in a theory that does actually not support them.
The rst-named author has presented two of the main results of this article at the IAS in Princeton in April 2013. We have completely formalized our construction in Agda [20] (see Section 2.4).
Contents
In Section 2, we introduce some basic notions and properties of MLTT and HoTT. The theory that we work in is standard intensional MLTT with a hierarchy of universes, and we assume all universes to be univalent.
In particular, this section introduces all concepts of HoTT that we need, and no prior knowledge of HoTT is required. On the other hand, the reader with background in HoTT can skip that section completely, maybe apart from Subsection 2.3 where we present a proof that U 1 is not a 1-type. We use Section 3 to develop some simple, but very useful theory on pointed types and the interaction of dependent sums, dependent products (which we synonymously call dependent functions), and loop spaces. Section 4 contains two of our main results: we show that universe U n is not n-truncated, and we construct a type that is strictly of truncation level n + 1, i. e. in particular not of level n. We devote Section 5 to connectedness, which is, in some sense, the dual notion of truncatedness. Intuitively, a type is n-truncated if it is trivial on dimension n and below. We dene a notion of n-connectedness in plain MLTT without using higher inductive types, and we show that our notion is (in HoTT) equivalent to the standard denition of n-connectedness. For any inhabited type A and number n, we can construct a type of which we show that it is n-connected in our sense but which is equivalent to the original type on levels above n. Finally, in Section 6, we combine the two constructions, and discuss how they are motivated by higher inductive types.
Preliminaries
We work in Martin-Löf Type Theory with the univalence axiom, as introduced by Voevodsky [36] . Finite Types and Natural Numbers There are the empty type 0, the unit type unit with canonical inhabitant , the boolean type 2 with canonical inhabitants 0 2 and 1 2 , and the natural numbers N in the lowest universe U 0 (and thereby in every universe). We write swap : 2 → 2 for the negation function.
Identity Types For a type A : U and inhabitants a, b : A, there is the type Id A (a, b) : U of equality proofs between a and b, or paths from the point a to the point b. The reason for the latter terminology is the interpretation of types as spaces. The equality type itself is also called path space. The canonical inhabitants are given by refl a : Id A (a, a) for a : A. The elimination rule (named J) says that, given a type family P : (Σ a,b:A Id A (a, b)) → U, it is sucient to construct P (a, a, refl a ) for any a in order to show P (a, b, p) for any a, b and p.
Applying this principle is often paraphrased as path induction. Following [35] , we write a = A b for this type. We omit the type A if it can easily be inferred.
As rst described by Hofmann and Streicher [15] , the identity type carries the structure of a groupoid, i. e. a category in which every morphism is an isomorphism. Every path p : a = A b has an inverse p −1 : b = A a, and all paths p : a = A b and q : b = A c have a composition p q : a = A c, with refl a acting as the identity element of a = A a. These operations can be constructed using path induction. The groupoid laws between them hold again up to to propositional equality. Finally, the non-dependent version of the eliminator deserves to be mentioned, in HoTT usually called transportation along a path, and in general often referred to as substitution: if P : A → U k is a family of types over A and there are u : a = A b as well as t : P (a), then there is u * (t) : P (b).
As = is thus reserved for propositional equality, we use ≡ for judgmental (i.e., denitional) equality. In particular, we write :≡ if we are giving a denition. Whenever we say that two terms are equal, propositional equality is meant.
Homotopy Type Theory
Let us recall some basic notions of HoTT. All of the following, except the univalence axiom below, are denitions that are only made within the previously described setting. They do not depend on any additional assumptions.
Truncation Levels (n-Types) A type A is contractible if there is a point a : A such that all points are equal to a,
For n ≥ −2, the statement that A is an n-type, is n-truncated, or has truncation level n, is dened as follows. For n ≡ −2, we take isContr(A) as the denition. Otherwise, the meaning is that all path spaces over elements of A are of truncation level one lower,
For n ≡ −1 and n ≡ 0, there are very common synonyms to n-type and ntruncated. By a standard lemma, A is a −1-type if and only if all its inhabitants are equal, i. e. if Π a,b:A a = b is inhabited. Such a type is called a proposition and has the property of being propositional. Further, a 0-type is a type with unique identity proofs; those types are called sets. For n ≡ −2, −1, 0, instead of is-n-type(A), we will therefore write isContr(A), isProp(A), isSet(A), respectively.
Equivalences Let A, B be types and f : A → B be a non-dependent function.
There are several equivalent ways to characterize f as an equivalence. One is by requiring that every ber of f is contractible. Another possibility is asking for an inverse of f with a coherent pair of proofs, making f a so-called half adjoint equivalence. An extensive treatment of equivalences can be found in [35, chapter 4] . Here, we only use the result that, for any non-dependent function f , there is a term isequiv A,B (f ) with the following properties:
• isequiv A,B (f ) is a proposition (a −1-type).
• isequiv A,B (f ) is inhabited if and only if f has an inverse, that is a map g : B → A together with a proof of Π a:A g(f (a)) = a and a proof of 
We call U • the universe of pointed types as this matches the intuition. Note, however, that it is really just a dened type, rather than a primitive of the theory as the universes U k are. If (A, a) and (B, b) are pointed types, a pointed function consists of a map f : A → B and a proof of f (a) = b, showing that the basepoint is preserved. If additionally f is an equivalence, we speak of a pointed equivalence.
We call a pointed type n-truncated (or an n-type, or say that it has truncation level n) if its underlying type has that property.
Loop spaces Let (A, a) be a pointed type. Its loop space [35, 
the elements of which are called loops. As Ω is thus an endomorphism on U • , it can be composed with itself. This gives us the n-fold iterated loop space
To gain intuition for Ω n+1 (A, a), we can unfold the denition. This shows immediately that the underlying type is refl n a = refl n a , while the point is the canonical inhabitant of the underlying type, namely refl n+1 a .
Remark. Note that we consider addition on N to be dened by recursion on the second argument to allow the presentation to follow the traditional convention of writing n + 1 instead of 1 + n. Some of the equalities that we claim to hold judgmentally depend on this assumption.
Univalence For types A and B, there is a canonical map
dened by path induction, where refl A : A = A is mapped to the identity equivalence (id A , e id ). This allows us to formulate the core axiom of HoTT:
Univalence Axiom: The map idtoeqv is an equivalence.
It implies that the type of paths between types is equivalent to the type of their equivalences,
As is standard, we assume the univalence axiom for every universe U k , i. e.
all universes are assumed univalent. It is a well-known and immediate consequence of the univalence axiom that the smallest universe is not a set (a 0-type). The standard proof goes as follows. Suppose isSet(U 0 ). Then, by denition of isSet, we have isProp(2 = 2). By univalence, we may replace 2 = 2 by 2 2. However, there are two distinct automorphisms on 2, yielding a contradiction. In formulae:
Intuitively, it may appear that the reason why U 0 is not a set is that an inhabitant of it, namely 2, is already not a proposition. However, possibly somewhat surprisingly, this simple idea does not generalize and the proof of ¬is-1-type(U 1 ) already requires signicantly more thought.
To prove the general version is-n-type(U n ) for any chosen n, we will develop some theory about pointed types. An important ingredient will be our localglobal looping principle, allowing us to freely switch between (higher) loops in the universe and families of loops that are indexed over some type.
We will make frequent use of the following basic properties. Most of them are directly stated in [35] , and the remaining ones are easy to prove using standard 
In the case of a non-dependent product X × Y , the latter type simplies to In this subsection, we want to present the proof that U 1 is not 1-truncated.
We will not reuse this result later as it will easily follow from more general constructions. However, the approach we take for this special case contains some of the key ideas and could therefore be supportive for understanding the later developments.
Let us rst try to prove ¬is-1-type(U 1 ) in a similar way as we have proved ¬isSet(U 0 ) in Subsection 2.2 above, choosing two inhabitants of U 1 that seem homotopically complicated enough:
In the attempt above, in the very rst step, we have to choose two inhabitants of U 1 with suciently complicated equality type. We have chosen U 0 as we have already seen before that U 0 is not a set.
The problem is that we seem unable to derive a contradiction from the assumption isSet(U 0 U 0 ). In fact, an expected meta-theoretic result is that the identity is the only denable non-constant endofunction on U 0 . Because of this, it is to be assumed that not even isContr(U 0 U 0 ) implies a contradiction.
To the best of our knowledge, no one has rigorously proven this form of parametricity in the presence of univalence so far, but it is commonly believed to hold.
The problematic step in the above attempt is the rst one, where we need to choose something in U 1 and take U 0 . We have to choose something better behaved. We use the type of loops in U 0 ,
Showing that the second universe is not a groupoid proceeds as follows:
Here, we have the type of paths between pairs. By P9, this corresponds to a pair of paths. What we use is that the second component will be trivial: e id lives in a propositional type, and its path type will thus be contractible. This implies that the type of paths between two equivalences is equivalent to the type of paths between the underlying functions. where u is a proof of p refl X = refl X p. Since K is propositional, we may conclude α = K β and consequently π 1 (α(2)) = π 1 (β(2)), which evaluates to λp.refl 2 = 2=2→2=2 λp.p and, after replacing 2 = 2 by 2 2 and applying on (swap, e swap ), implies the same contradiction as we got in the proof of ¬isSet(U 0 ).
In the general case, we consider higher loops in higher universes. The core obstacle in translating the above proof is the step where q * (p) = p is observed to hold for q :≡ refl and q :≡ p by virtue of q * (p) = q −1 p q. In general, it is not so clear how a uniform presentation of transportation along higher loops would look like. However, it turns out that this obstacle can be eectively bypassed for higher dimensions as we will see below.
A note on our formalized proof
Supplementing this article, we have formalized all of our results in the programming language and proof assistant Agda [29] , making use of the HoTT community's Agda library [16] . The formalization [20] 
Pointed Types
Pointed types, as dened in [35] , are a simple but helpful concept. Their properties can usually easily be formulated in terms of ordinary types. For our presentation we will develop some of their theory explicitly in this section, aiming to provide an elegant way of expressing how Ω interacts with Σ and Π.
Dependent Sums and Loops
We will rst treat the interaction of Σ and Ω. 
Extending the notion of truncatedness from types to predicates, we say that the pointed predicate (P, p) is n-truncated if P is a family of n-types.
Remark. Note that a pointed type can always be seen as a pointed predicate over the trivial pointed type (1, ).
Let (P, p) be a pointed predicate over some pointed type (A, a). There is an induced type familyP over Ω(A, a), given byP (q) :≡ q * (p) = P (a) p. The type over the basepoint is P (refl a ) ≡ (p = p) and therefore trivially inhabited by reexivity. This allows us to dene a bered version of Ω: Denition 3.2 (Ω). For a pointed type A ≡ (A, a), we denẽ Ω : Pred
Consequently, Ω andΩ together form the following endofunction:
Given a pair of a pointed type and a pointed predicate, it is straightforward to construct a pointed type corresponding to the dependent sum. 
We write Σ
• A P synonymously for Σ • (A, P).
We are now ready to formulate precisely how dependent sums and loop spaces interact:
Lemma 3.4. The operators Σ
• and Ω commute in the following sense:
Proof. Let A ≡ (A, a) be a pointed type with a pointed predicate P ≡ (P, p).
By function extensionality (P5), it is enough to show that both sides of the equation are equal if applied to (A, P). Let us calculate:
Dependent Products and Loops
The situation is similar, and even simpler, if we want to examine the interaction of Π and Ω. Given a family of pointed types over some (ordinary) type A, there is a straightforward way to construct a pointed type out of the given data corresponding to the dependent product.
Denition 3.5 (Π • ). We dene the operator Π
• by:
We use the notations Π With this at hand, we are ready to prove: Lemma 3.6. Ω and Π
• commute in the following sense: given a type A and a family F of pointed types over A, we have
Proof. Let us do the following calculation:
Homotopically Complicated Types
In this section, we will prove two main results of this article: rst, in MLTT with the univalence axiom, we can construct a type that strictly has truncation level n; and second, the universe U n is not n-truncated.
We begin with a lemma that tells us how a truncated Σ-component can be neutralized by Ω.
Lemma 4.1. Let n be a natural number. Further, let A be a pointed type and P be a pointed predicate over A of truncation level n − 2. Then,
Proof. We do induction on n. For the base case n ≡ 0, the statement is exactly given by P10. For the induction case, we have the following chain of equalities:
For the second to last step, note that if P is n − 1-truncated, thenΩP is n − 2-truncated.
We are now ready to prove our local-global looping principle, stating that a loop in the universe is the same as a family of loops in its underlying type:
Lemma 4.2 (local-global looping)
. Let A be a type and n be a natural number.
Then,
Proof. The proof is again done by a calculation, utilizing most of the theory we have developed so far:
(by univalence and P9)
(by Lemma 4.1)
It will be useful to consider the restriction of a universe to its n-types: For n ∈ N, let us write P n (X) for the type of n + 1-loops that live in the universe U ≤n n and have basepoint X. More precisely, we abbreviate
Homotopically, these loops P n (X) are rather tame:
Corollary 4.6 (of Lemma 4.5). P n is a family of sets, that is,
An n + 1-loop consists of a basepoint X and the actual loop around X. The type of n + 1-loops in universe U ≤n n is therefore given by
For technical reasons, we choose to dene Loop −1 :≡ 2 in the lowest universe U 0 .
This type is also fairly tame homotopically:
Lemma 4.7. For all natural numbers n, the type Loop n−1 is n-truncated, that is, we can construct h n : is-n-type(Loop n−1 ).
Proof. The claim is clearly fullled for n ≡ 0, so let us assume n ≥ 1. By P3, it is enough to examine the two parts of the dependent sum separately. The required property for the rst part is given by Lemma 4.5. Further, the second component is a family of sets by Corollary 4.6, which suces by P2. Lemma 4.8. For all n ≥ 0, the type Ω n+1 U n , Loop n−1 has a non-trivial inhabitant. The same is true for Ω n+1 U ≤n n , (Loop n−1 , h n ) . Proof. Observe that the pointed type U ≤n n , (Loop n−1 , h n ) can be written as (and is judgmentally equal to) the expression Σ • (Un,Loop n−1 ) (is-n-type, h n ). As the predicate is-n-type is propositional, Lemma 4.1 implies the equivalence of the two loop spaces of this lemma, and we may restrict ourselves to showing that the claim holds for Ω n+1 U n , Loop n−1 .
We do induction on n. For n ≡ −1, we have to provide a non-trivial inhabitant of 2 = 2. This is swap, which is dierent from the trivial inhabitant refl 2 (see Section 2.2).
Assume n ≡ m + 1 and calculate:
The underlying type of this last pointed type has the following inhabitant:
where d q is dened as follows:
• for m ≡ 0, the type of d q is q * (q) = q, which is inhabited by P8 and the fact that equality carries a groupoid structure. Note that this case corresponds to the special case we already handled, and that we are not able to obviate this additional coherence condition here.
• for m ≥ 1, the type of d q is contractible by Corollary 4.6 and the denition ofΩ, providing a canonical choice for d q . 
If ξ was trivial, the term π 1 (ξ(X, q)) ≡ q would be trivial in P n (X) for any (X, q) : Loop m . But this is invalidated by (1).
This allows us to prove:
Theorem 4.9. In Martin-Löf Type Theory with a hierarchy of univalent universes U 0 , U 1 , U 2 , . . ., the universe U n is not an n-type. Formally, for any natural number n, the type
is inhabited.
Remark. It is a subtle question whether this result can be stated in the form Π n:N ¬is-n-type (U n ) .
If the theory provides an internal type of universe levels that can be eliminated into from the natural numbers, then all our constructions can be carried out uniformly over a natural number inhabitant n in the context. Otherwise, the constructions are to be viewed parameterized over a natural number n in the meta theory, yielding a derivation in the theory only when instantiated with a xed n.
of the theorem. If U n was an n-type, then Ω n+1 U n , Loop n−1 would be propositional, contradicting Lemma 4.8.
At the same time, we have solved the question of constructing a strict n-type that was discussed several times at the UF special year in Princeton:
Theorem 4.10. For a given n ≥ −2, there is (in the settings of Theorem 4.9) a type that is an n + 1-type but not an n-type. In particular, for n ≥ −1, the type Loop n has this property. Further, for n ≥ 0, the universe of n-types at level n, namely U ≤n n , is such a strict n + 1-type. Proof. For n ≡ −2, the empty type proves the statement. The claim for U ≤n n follows in the same way as Theorem 4.9, combined with Lemma 4.5. Loop −1 ≡ 2 is clearly strictly a set. For n ≥ 0, Lemma 4.7 shows that Loop n is n + 1-truncated. To see that it is not n-truncated, observe that the rst component is U ≤n n and therefore not n-truncated while the second component is always inhabited.
Connectedness

Truncations via Higher Inductive Types and via Universal Properties
As mentioned in the introduction, a (closed) type in MLTT can be interpreted as a Kan complex in the simplicial set model, and, by the realization functor to topological spaces, as a CW-complex. Under this interpretation, ordinary small inductive types (such as the natural numbers) correspond to the construction of a very simple CW-complex, consisting only of 0-cells (points).
In order to do more advanced synthetic homotopy theory in HoTT, it seems therefore desirable and reasonable to add higher inductive types (HITs) to the theory [35, Chapter 6] . These do not only allow the construction of 0-cells, as usual inductive types do, but also the construction of higher cells. Thereby, more complicated CW-complexes can be built. However, the general principle is not fully understood yet, especially when it comes to the computational aspect.
At the moment, it is unclear how HITs can be added to the theory without causing similar problems as the univalence axiom. On the other hand, it seems plausible that such a computational interpretation, should it be found for the univalence axiom, could also be done similarly for HITs.
An easy example of a higher inductive type is the circle S [32] and later by Licata [21] (see also [23] )
that the fundamental group [ As HITs allow us to add paths at an arbitrarily high level to a type, it is clear that they can be used to construct types that are not n-truncated for a given n -after all, being not an n-type is by denition the same as not having only trivial paths at level n. In S 1 , a path is added on the rst level, and similarly, the higher spheres S n can be constructed by adding paths on higher levels. For a discussion of the spheres, see [35, Chapter 8] .
The only thing that is actually needed is showing that the path generated by the highest-level constructor of the sphere is indeed non-trivial. However, even for this seemingly simple property is not amenable to an instant argument.
While S n has Z as n-th homotopy group, which immediately implies that it is not an n − 1-type, calculating it in HoTT via the long exact sequence requires some eort. It was performed by Brunerie and Licata [22] .
On the other hand, the construction of Loop n that we present in this article can be understood as a way to use HITs even if the theory does not support them. Recall that our type Loop n was (after unfolding the denition of P n ) dened as
If HITs are available, Loop n is equivalent to the function type
Even if we do not have S n available in the theory, we can thus still talk about how the sphere could be mapped into another type. Another certain class of higher inductive types is important for a further construction we want to present. The notion of connectedness (as dened in [35, Chapter 7.5] ) is from a certain point of view dual to that of truncation levels. If a type A is n-truncated, it means that A is trivial above dimension n. In contrast, a type is n-connected if it is trivial below dimension n in the topological model. However, this property is tricky to express in type theory: if we directly state that a type is trivial at some dimension, it immediately implies that it is trivial at all higher dimensions as well (see P2). The way Homotopy Type Theory deals with this problem is the following: in order to express that a type is n-connected, the type is rst articially made trivial above dimension n, and then required to be contractible. This is done using a special sort of HITs, namely truncations [35, Chapter 7.3] . Given a type A, the n-truncation is, roughly speaking, constructed by adding paths between any two objects at dimension n + 1 of A, thus cutting o all possibly interesting homotopical structure above dimension n. We want to give a formal denition that can be stated without developing the theory of HITs:
Denition 5.1 (truncation, c. f. [35, Theorem 7.3.2] ). For a given type A : U and n ≥ −2, the n-truncation is characterized by the following rules:
• Formation rule: A n is an n-type in U.
• Introduction rule: there is a map |−| n : A → A n .
• Elimination rule: for a universe V and a family (P, h) : A n → V ≤n of n-types, any dependent function g : Π A P •|−| n can be lifted to a function g : Π A n P .
• Computation rule: for any g as in the rule above and a : A, we have the judgmental β-rule g(|a| n ) ≡ g(a).
We say that a theory has truncations if the truncation exists for any type A and any n ≥ −2.
The denition we need is then:
Even though the denition of connectedness requires HITs, we can do surprisingly much without them. We say that a statement holds in MLTT if it only requires plain Martin-Löf Type Theory, without univalence or higher inductive types. The setting that we have considered so far, namely MLTT with a hierarchy of univalent universes, is MLTT+UA. If a lemma additionally requires truncations, we say that it holds in MLTT+UA+TRUNC.
We will use the fact that truncations can be characterized by their universal properties in MLTT. This allows us to formulate the statement that a type is n-connected in MLTT, with the name being justied by the fact that we can prove is-n-connected = is-n-connected , in MLTT+UA+TRUNC.
Given a type A with an inhabitant a, we will (in MLTT) construct the nconnected version of A with basepoint a. In MLTT+UA, that type has the same loop spaces as A above dimension n and is n-connected . For n ≡ −1, this corresponds to constructing the connected component of a in the ordinary topological sense.
The construction of this n-connected version can also be done fairly easily in MLTT+UA+TRUNC, which is very likely to be known, although we are unable to nd it in the standard literature.
We rst want to specify what it means in plain MLTT to have the universal property of a truncation. Denition 5.3. Let U and V be two universes, A be a type in U, and n ≥ −2 be a number. Let X be an n-type in U and c a function from A to X. We say that (X, c) (or just c) has the universal property of the n-truncation of A with respect to V if, for any n-type Y in V, the function types X → Y and A → Y are equivalent, and the equivalence is given by composition with c:
Let us now dene a type with the property that any of its inhabitant can serve as an n-truncation. The crucial point will consist of perspicaciously inserting the assumption that certain truncations exist deep into connectedness construction types, taking care not to change their expected properties.
Denition 5.4. Given two universes U and V, a type A in U and n ≥ −2 in MLTT, dene the type of n-truncations of A to be the type of maps c : A → X for some n-type X : U which satisfy the universal property:
Note that this type is not in universe U or V, but it inhabits every universe that U and V both inhabit. Given t ≡ (X, h, c, u) : T n U ,V (A), we write type(t) for the component X (i.e., type ≡ π 1 ) and cons(t) for the component c (i.e., cons ≡ π 1 • π 2 ).
Remark. In MLTT+UA+TRUNC, the type T n U ,V (A) is inhabited by the n-truncation of A, namely A n [35, Lemma 7.3.3] . For MLTT or even MLTT+UA, which we consider here, we strongly believe that an inhabitant of T n U ,V (A) can, in general, not be constructed: the n-truncation is not denable.
Our intention is to use an (assumed) inhabitant of T n U ,V (A) in the same way as A n could be used if it was part of the theory. While this turns out to be possible, there are a couple of obstacles:
First, the only assumption we make is that T n U ,V (A) includes the encoding of a universal property. By [35, Lemma 7.3.3] , the truncation A n has this universal property with respect to n-types of any universe. Being unable to polymorphically quantify over all universes (see Remark 4), we have to restrict ourselves to a xed elimination unverse V in in T n U ,V (A). We need to be careful though: it is not sucient for our purposes to require the universal property with respect to all n-types in the same universe as A, as this would prevent us from performing large elimination. For that reason, we require the universal property for all n-types that live in some xed universe V, which for most constructions will have to be larger than U.
Second, the truncation A n , dened as a HIT, has important judgmental computation rules, i. e. equations that hold judgmentally. Such rules have the potential to make the theory strictly stronger: for example, an interval type with judgmental β-rule implies function extensionality [33] . It is therefore not a priori clear that the universal property that we have at hand suces for everything we want to do. However, even disregarding that, judgmental computational rules oer in many cases a huge simplication. Indeed, our formalization of the proof is considerably more tedious than the analogous proof using A n would be. Third, note that in the denition of T n U ,V (A), we only ask for a non-dependent universal property, while (in MLTT+UA+TRUNC) A n has the dependent version of this property. While we could encode the dependent universal property in the denition as well, we do not need to: as we will see, the non-dependent universal property implies the dependent one.
Consequences of the Universal Property
Our next goal is to prove a couple of properties of up A:U V ≤n and T n U ,V in MLTT. For the lemmata in this subsection, let U and V be two universes where V is at least as big as U, i. e. every type in U is also of type V. Further, let A : U be a type and n ≥ −2 a number.
Lemma 5.5. A map e : A → X for some n-type X : U has the universal property if and only if it has the dependent universal property,
where the latter expression is dened as
Proof. The direction if is trivial. For the other direction, we need the following statement: For a function u : C → D between types C, D and E : D → U a type family in any universe U , dependent functions from c : C to E(u(c)) are equivalent to liftings of u through π 1 : Σ D E:
Note that for C ≡ D and u ≡ id this just says that Π C E is the type of sections of the rst projection. The equivalence 3 could be slightly strengthened by making D (and E) dependent on C, but we do not need this generality here. An easy way to prove (3) is combining a couple of equivalences. First,
holds by strong function extensionality P5 combined with the (∞, ∞)-version of the axiom of choice, which is by no means an axiom, but always fullled in MLTT [35, Theorem 2.15.7] . Further, we have
The To prove the only if direction of the lemma, assume e : A → X satises the non-dependent universal property. Let Y, h : X → V ≤n be a family of n-types over X. SetỸ :≡ Σ X Y ; by P3, this is an n-type in V. By up A:U V ≤n (e), the map λf.f • e induces an equivalence (X →Ỹ ) (A →Ỹ ). (6) Fix s : X →Ỹ . We then have π 1 • s : X → X. By the assumed universal property, composition with e is an equivalence (X → X) (A → X). As equivalences preserve path spaces (P7), we have (
This immediately gives us
In general, for any types C, D, a type family P : D → U and an equivalence h : C → D, we have that Σ C P •h Σ D P . Applying this rule with C ≡ X →Ỹ , D ≡ A →Ỹ , P (s) ≡ π 1 • s = e and the equivalence (6) for h, we get
Finally, we are ready to prove Π X Y Π A Y • e. We start with Π X Y and apply (3) with u ≡ id X to transform it into Σ s:X→Ỹ π 1 • s = id X . Using rst (7) and then (8) − → X 2 , we need to show that they are equal. Note that the universal property itself is propositional, and thus, we do not have to construct a path between the two witnesses of this property. Such an equality proof therefore just corresponds to an equivalence e : X 1 X 2 and a proof of e • e 1 = e 2 . The universal property of e 1 tells us that X 1 → X 2 and A → X 2 are equivalent. As the latter type is inhabited by e 2 , we nd an inhabitant e of the former, and we get the property e • e 1 = e 2 for free. The construction of the inverse of e is completely analogous, and the proof that their composition is the identity proceeds by elimination using the universal properties of e 1 and e 2 . Lemma 5.8. Assume we have a third universe U which is at least as big as U and at most as big as V (any type in U is a type in U , and any type in U is a type in V). Assume further we have types A : U and B : U as well as (for some n) an inhabitant t A : T Assuming T U ,V is inhabited at the necessary points, we need information on how our notion of truncation interacts with dependent sum types and path spaces. The corresponding lemmata are well-known for the truncation with judgmental computation rule (i.e., that are part of the theory) of [35] . Their proofs can be modied to only use the universal property, allowing us to transfer them to our setting. As explained in Remark 5.1, reasoning about reduction behaviour propositionally is tedious, particularly so whenever it occurs in a type. The second lemma is the reason why we need to parametrize T U ,V over two universes, enabling us to perform the correct elimination steps. Still, the proofs of the lemmata follow well-known ideas [35] . We only give rough sketches.
Rigorous proofs can be found, as for everything else in this article, in our formalization [20] .
The following lemma can be understood as attening (cf. [35, Section 6.12]) for truncations.
Lemma 5.10. Let t A : T n U ,V (A) and P, h P : type(t A ) → U ≤n (i.e., P is a family of types over type(t A ) and h P is a proof that it is a family of n-types).
Proof. We can directly dene functions
After applying the universal property of T n U ,V (Σ A P • cons(t Σ )), the function f gives us a map from the left-hand side to the right-hand side of the equivalence 9.
For the other direction, we need to use the dependent universal property of T n U ,V (A) together with g and uncurry the constructed function.
To prove that the two maps are inverses of each other, we use the (dependent) universal properties again. Both directions are straightforward.
In the statement of the next lemma, note that T m U ,U (X) is always implied by T n U ,V (X) (if U : V) and is therefore a more minimalistic assumption.
Lemma 5.11. Let U, A, n be as before, but let V be a universe larger than U in the sense that we have U : V. Assume we have t A : T n+1 U ,V (A) as well as a 2 ) . Then, for any given a 1 , a 2 : A, the equivalence
holds.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one in [35, Theorem 7.3.12] , but more tedious for lack of judgmental computation rules. In the application of the encode-decode method, it is necessary to use the dependent universal property of t A to construct a map into U ≤n , a type that does not inhabit U, and that is why we need to ask for the universal property with respect to types in V instead.
5.3
Construction of n-connected Types
With the previous lemmata at hand, we are able to perform the discussed construction.
Denition 5.12. In MLTT, given a pointed type (A, a) and n ≥ −1, we write A, a n for the n-connected version of (A, a), dened by A, a n :≡ Σ b:A Π t:T n−1
It has the canonical inhabitant (a, a) where a :≡ λt.cons(t)(refl a ). Note that A, a n is not a type in U but a type in V for any V satisfying U : V.
In the above denition, we include the case n ≡ −1, but note that it trivial in the sense that X −1 X. The construction is interesting already for n ≡ 0 though, which corresponds to the connected component of a.
Lemma 5.13. In MLTT, A, a n is, on dimension n + 1 and above, equivalent to A, in the sense that
Proof. Write ( A, a n , a) as a pointed dependent sum with an n − 1-truncated pointed predicate over (A, a). The statement then follows from Lemma 4.1.
Note that the formulation of the above lemma is justied by the fact that the n-th dimension of a type is entirely described by the n-th loop spaces. If a = b, then the types a = a and a = b are equivalent, and therefore, examining the elements of the loop space is enough to determine the whole structure of a type above some dimension. This principle was used in the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Let us now discuss the connectedness properties of the type X n for appropriate X and n.
Denition 5.14. In plain MLTT, given universes U and V as well as C : V, we dene the following notion of n-connectedness:
is-n-connected U ,V (C) :≡ Π t:T U ,V Π t C :T n V,V (C) isContr(type(t C ))
The notation T U ,V is used as introduced in Corollary 5.7.
Lemma 5.15. In MLTT+UA, for any pointed type A : U (with a point a : A) and universe V that contains U, i. e. U : V, the type A, a n is n-connected in the above sense, i.e.
is-n-connected U ,V ( A, a n ).
Proof. Unfolding the denitions, given t : T U ,V ,
we need to show that type(t C ) is contractible. We perform a sequence of steps, each transforming type(t C ) into an equivalent type. Heavy use of Corollary 5.9 is made. This is especially true for the very rst step: by Corollary 5.7 and P11, the remaining occurrence of Π in (11) can be removed, as t(n−1, a = A b) can be viewed as an inhabitant of T n−1 U ,U (a = A b).
Consequently it is enough to prove the type type t (n, Σ b:A type(t(n − 1, a = A b))) (12) contractible. Next, we apply Lemma 5.11 which provides an equivalence type(t(n − 1, a = A b)) P (cons(t(n, A))(b))
where P : type(t(n, A)) → U P (x) :≡ cons(t(n, A))(a) = type(t(n,A)) x, transforming the type (12) into type (t (n, Σ A P • cons(t(n, A)))) .
Clearly, P is a family of n − 1-types. We may therefore apply Lemma 5.10, telling us that the type (14) is equivalent to Σ type(t(n,A)) P, (15) and this path-from type is trivially contractible.
The name of the entity in Denition 5.14 is justied in that we took the standard denition of connectivity and replaced the use of truncation with an inhabitant of our type of truncations before quantifying over it. Unsurprisingly, it turns out to be equivalent to the standard notion of connectedness (Denition 5.2) if available.
Lemma 5.16. In MLTT+UA+TRUNC, for any U and V, we have Π A:U Π n:N is-n-connected U ,V (A) is-n-connected(A).
Proof. In MLTT+UA+TRUNC, the function type T U ,V has a canonical inhabitant, as mentioned in Remark 5.1. Together with Lemma 5.6, this shows that T U ,V is contractible, and property P11 validates the stated equivalence.
To conclude this section, let us make two short remarks, both of which refer to MLTT+UA+TRUNC. The rst is an immediate consequence of the lemmata and denitions above: for a given pointed type (A, a) and a given n ≥ −1, the type Σ b:A b = a n−1 is n-connected and has, above dimension n, the same properties as A (with basepoint a, of course). The second remark is that n-connectedness can be dened without referring to n-truncations at all, but only by using propositional truncations [35, Exercise 7.6] . Those could be seen as somewhat more elementary in the sense that they, or notions similar to them, have been considered a long time before HoTT was developed; see [8] , [6] . Instead of saying that a type is n-connected if its ntruncation is contractible, we could ask for it to be merely inhabited (in the sense of [35] ), and all its path spaces to be n − 1-connected:
is-−2-connected (A) :≡ 1 is-n + 1-connected (A) :≡ A −1 × Π x,y:A is-n-connected (x = y)
This notion of connectedness is equivalent to the one stated in Denition 5.2, as we have shown in our formalization. We think that, generally in HoTT, there might be cases where this notion is more convenient to use, as it supports direct induction on n. Unfortunately, it does not seem suitable for a modication that gives a strong enough denition of connectedness in MLTT+UA as does our Denition 5.14.
Conclusion
In Section 4, we have seen that U n is not an n-type and that U n+1 contains a strict n + 1-type, namely U ≤n n . Combining that result with the construction of the previous section, we immediately get:
Theorem 6.1. In MLTT+UA, for a given natural number n, we can construct a type, dened by
n (with h n as in Lemma 4.7) such that, purely in MLTT+UA, the following propositions are provable:
M n is n + 1-truncated: is-n + 1-type(M n ) M n is not n-truncated: ¬is-n-type(M n ) M n is n-connected:
is-n-connected Un+2,Un+3 (M n )
Note that these properties also imply that, in MLTT+UA+TRUNC, the n-th homotopy group [35 A related result with much stronger assumptions was shown before using Eilenberg-Mac Lane Spaces [35, Theorem 8.10.3] : in MLTT with univalence and not just truncations, but general higher inductive types, it is possible to construct a type K(G, n) that is an n-type such that the n-th homotopy group equals some abelian group G and all the others are trivial. That construction uses higher inductive types not just to truncate, but also to produce the actual non-trivial higher paths. Again, this is not too surprising -the property of K(G, n) point directly to that usage of HITs. We have shown that, even without them, we can get quite close.
